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Security as Completeness
A Peircean Semiotic Reading of the Psychology of Attachment
Matteo Santarelli
 
1. Introduction: Peirce’s Antipsychologism
1 The  psychologism  vs.  anti-psychologism  debate  is  comprised  of  two  contrasting
epistemological and philosophical standpoints. From an anti-psychologist standpoint,
psychologism consists of confusion between the domain of logic and the domain of
psychology,  which  should  properly  remain  separated.  The  resulting  confusion  is
considered to have damaging epistemological consequences. Therefore, every intrusion
of  psychological  elements  into  logic  should  be  condemned  as  an  instance  of
psychologism.  On  the  other  hand,  psychologism  maintains  that  the  entanglement
between psychological processes and logic is inescapable. It is impossible to account for
the rules of logic without making use of psychological terminology.
2 Charles  Sanders  Peirce  often  explicitly  endorsed an  ant-psychologist  standpoint.  In
contrast to John Stuart Mill, he refused any attempt to ground logic in psychology. He
considered the two as being two different kinds of disciplines.  Logic is a normative
science,  devoted  to  establishing  valid  laws  of  inference,  among  other  things;
psychology is conceived as an experimental, descriptive (Hookway 2012: 90) science,
“concerned  principally  with  explaining  the  affective,  volitional,  and  cognitive
processes and dispositions of human and other organisms” (Colapietro 2003: 164). 
3 From an epistemological point of view, Peirce’s antipsychologism is grounded in his
long  standing  criticism  of  introspectionism.  Starting  from  his  early  anti-cartesian
essays,  Peirce  refused  to  grant  any  epistemological  privilege  to  first  person
introspectionist approaches. On the contrary, he radically contested the very idea that
one could achieve a transparent, direct and immediate knowledge of her own internal
states.  All  knowledge  is  mediated  by  signs,  even  the  knowledge  of  our  internal
dimension.  This  is  the key assumption inspiring Peirce’s  long-standing externalism.
With  respect  to  the  issue  of  anti-psychologism,  Peirce’s  externalism  suggests  that
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knowledge of our internal psychological states is epistemologically irrelevant from a
logical point of view.
4 Calcaterra (2006) acknowledges both the taxonomic explicit distinction between logic
and  psychology  and  the  epistemological  centrality  of  externalism.  However,  she
recommends a  reconsideration of  Peirce’s  anti-psychologism.  From her perspective,
the externalist criterion must be left untouched. While psychology deals with how the
mind works internally, logic focuses on external, publicly observable signs. But Peirce’s
externalist arguments against psychologism lead to a specific viewpoint, which must be
distinguished from Kant’s standard version of antypsychologism. 
5 Kant’s  assumption  of  the  independence  of  logic  from  psychology  leads  to  the
acknowledgment of a trascendental level, in which the necessary rules of thought must
be situated. In contrast, Peirce’s externalism brings about a distinction between logic
and psychology,  which must always be framed in accordance with the fundamental
principle  of  continuity,  which  he  calls  synechism. Once  we  give  up  with the
introspectionist paradigm, we must admit that psychological sciences as well aim at
discovering the functioning of the mind by means of signs. Therefore, any distinction
between psychology as a science of introspection and logic as a science which analyzes
the relation between external signs proves to be meaningless, rather than false. It is
meaningless because introspection is in itself impossible, if by introspection we mean
immediate and epistemologically ideal access to internal states. The mind as well is
made of signs, and therefore also the knowledge of the mind, even of its internal side, is
mediated  by  signs.  Once  we  acknowledge  this  semiotic  continuity,  a  functional
distinction  between  logic  and  psychology  will  substitute  for  an  ontological  or
epistemological one:
Synechism does not certainly imply a denial of such distinctions; it rather suggests
to look upon these distinctions as functional aspects of human existence, namely as
different and yet “substantially” contiguous features of an evolving reality, or as
signs of its own factual complexity. On the other hand, there is no sign which cannot
be included in the process  of  reasoning,  thus acquiring an “objective” meaning
which  also  entails  a  self-controlled  selection  of  the  “pragmatic”  and  intellectual
implications  as  connected  with  whatsoever  acknowledgement  of  objectivity.
(Calcaterra 2006: 44; original emphasis)
6 When understood in a strong ontological and epistemological sense, psychologism and
anti-psychologism  represent  two  answers  to  a  single,  impossible  problem:  that  of
clearly defining the boundaries between logic and psychology, either by drastically and
substantially separating the two domains – anti-psychologism – or by conflating the
former  into  the  latter  –  psychologism.  Peirce’s  antipsychologism does  not  blur  the
distinction between logic and psychology. Rather, it shows how this distinction cannot
be grounded on the externalism vs. internalism dichotomy. This would be impossible,
insofar as nothing like a purely introspectionist psychological science exists:
I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it is practically
certain that we cannot directly, nor with much accuracy even indirectly, observe
what passes in the consciousness of any other person, while it is far from certain
that we can do so ( and accurately record what [we] can even links at best but very
glibberly) even in the case of what should through our own mind, it is much safer to
define  all  mental  characters  as  far  as  possible  in  terms  of  their  outward
manifestations. (EP2 465)
7 The former quote apparently suggests the idea that a Peircean treatment of psychology
should be an intrinsically anti-psychologist one. But these ironic words should not be
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taken too literally. Refusal of the introspectionist paradigm in psychology does not lead
to  the  reduction  of  psychology  to  a  kind  of  purely  behavioristic  semiotics.  Such  a
misunderstanding  could  arise  from  the  fallacious  identification  of  anti-
introspectionism with the denial of the existence of internal psychological states. 
8 It is true that the pragmatist battle against introspectionism led by authors like Peirce
and George  Herbert  Mead entails  the  refusal  of  inner  knowledge  as  an  immediate,
transparent  and  epistemologically  flawless  relation  between  oneself  and  her  own
internal  mental  states.  This  standpoint  could  be  be  superficially  equated  with  a
watsonian  form  of  behaviorism,  denying  the  very  existence  of  mental  and
psychological states. But this is not the case for pragmatist authors. For both Peirce and
Mead,  anti-introspectionism  does  not  entail  repudiating  the  existence  of  internal
psychological states.1 Rather, it simply implies that the knowledge and the expression
of such states is  always mediated,  or embodied,  by communication.  This  involves a
clear epistemological assumption: differently from logic, defined as the formal doctrine
of signs, psychology is able to study internal states, on the condition that this inquiry
be focused on the communicative processes through which these internal states are
expressed and conveyed. 
9 A Peircean version of anti-psychologism is therefore disinclined to reductionism in two
senses.  It  opposes  the  reduction  of  logical  to  psychological  processes.  Moreover,  it
opposes  a  behaviorist-like  reduction  of  psychology  to  the  simple  observation  of
external behaviors,  and the consequent eliminativism. Thus, such a version of anti-
psychologism  implies  a  communicative  and  semiotic  continuity  between  logic  and
psychology. At the same time, it encourages a functional distinction between these two
domains.  Logic  consists  of  a  formal  doctrine  of  the  connection  of  external  signs.
Psychology  deals  with  psychological  processes  by  refusing  the  criteria  of
introspectionism – the very idea of a flawless and immediate epistemological acces to
the internal sphere of experience. At the same time, it considers the focus on internal
psychological  states  as  an  inescapable  part  of  psychological  inquiry.  The  focus  on
communicative  processes,  therefore,  does  not  rule  out  the  importance  of  internal
states.2 
10 In  her  2006  article,  Calcaterra  argues  that  a  Peircean  version  of  anti-psychologism
involves  neither  a  dismissal  of  the  internal  dimension  of  experience,  nor  the
consequent reduction of psychology to a kind of behavioral and behaviorist semiotic.
On the contrary, Peirce acknowledges that the inner aspect of sensations and emotions
refers to the “costitution of the mind” (CP 5.291). At the same time, he deems as equally
false the idea according to which sensations and emotion belong exclusively to the
inner dimension. Peirce believes that sensations and emotions involve a relation with
the external world. As soon as emotions and sensations are expressed – e.g. by saying “I
am sad,” “I am angry,” these allegedly purely internal states become “interconnected
with  the  social  cognitive  and  value-related  criteria  shaping  the  ‘external’  frame of
individual  life”  (Calcaterra  2006:  38).  This  twofold  acknowledgement  of  the
psychological importance of internal states, and of the necessity of a communicative
approach to their expression, establishes both the autonomy of psychology from logic,
understood as the formal doctrine of external signs, and the continuity of these two
discipines into the general communicative and semiotic framework. Therefore, rather
than assuming an eliminativist  standpoint with regards to self-related phenomena,3
Peirce seems to encourage a study of psychological processes based on semiotics. 
Security as Completeness
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-1 | 2017
3
11 In this paper, I  would not move from a Peircean standpoint in order to discuss the
persistence of psychological processes in logical processes. Rather, my inquiry moves in
the opposite direction. Specifically, I intend to employ Peirce’s semiotic tools in order
to inquire into the logic of psychological processes. This last statement could puzzle the
reader. How could a semiotic inquiry into psychology have a logical import? Did not
Peirce draw a clear distinction between logic and semiotics? Wouldn’t we be better off
making a previous methodological decision by choosing between logical and semiotic
approaches to psychology? 
12 Despite the apparent contradiction, from a Peircean standpoint it makes perfect sense
to maintain that a semiotic account involves, to a certain degree, a logical account as
well. As Peirce clearly stated, logic, understood “in its general sense,” is “only another
name  for  semiotic,  the  quasi  necessary,  or  formal,  doctrine  of  signs”  (CP  2.227).
Therefore,  a  psychological  account  could  be  provided  with  logical  and  semiotic
relevance,  as  long  as  we  acknowledge  that  what  is  relevant  to  both  logic  and  to
semiotics is “the thought embodied in some communicable form such that it might be
made  a  focal  object  of  critical  assessment.  In  other  words,  what  is  salient  is  the
symbolization of thought” (Colapietro 2003: 165-6). Following this logic, attention will
be focused on signs and communicative practices,  rather than on the introspective
realm of internal representations. 
13 Bearing Peirce’s version of anti-psychologism in mind, I  will  focus on psychological
processes  understood  as  communicative  processes.  This  approach  is  not  without
precedent.  Communication has  been a  key  issue  in  psychology ever  since  Sigmund
Freud wrote  his  first  articles.  Despite  considering  the  unconscious  as  non-liguistic,
Freud  acknowledged  the  key  role  played  by  language  in  psychoanalytic  therapy.
Therapy  seems  then  to  happen  through  language  and  by  means  of  language.  As
witnessed  by  the  familiar  case  of  Anna  O.’s  therapy,  psychoanalysis  consists  in  a
“talking cure” (Breuer & Freud 1895/1995). Several decades later, and from a totally
different perspective, Paul Watzlawick and his research group in Palo Alto developed a
radical  psychological  constructivisim,  based on the essential  role  of  communicative
exchanges (Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson 1967). These are just two examples of how
the role of communicative processes has been of great importance for psychological
theory, in all its complexity and in all its varieties. 
14 In this article, I will use Peirce’s approach to communication and semiosis in order to
discuss the outcomes and the categories of a specific psychological theory, in this case,
attachment theory. In the second part, I will discuss the historical antecedent attempts
at inquiring into psychological processes in a semiotic way. In the third part,  I  will
employ Giovanni Maddalena’s Peircean distinction between complete and incomplete
gestures  as  a  tool  for  psychological  inquiry.  In  the  third  part  I  will  discuss  the
theoretical framework of attachment theory, focusing specifically on the distinction
between secure, dismissing and preoccupied attachment patterns. By presenting and
discussing  different  measurements  of  attachment,  such  as  the  Adult  Attachment
Interview  (AAI,  George,  Kaplan  &  Main  1985/96),  the  Adult  Attachment  Projection
(AAP, George & West 2006), and the Patient Attachment Coding System (PACS, Talia,
Miller-Bottome  &  Daniel  2015),  in  parts  4,  5  and  6  I  will  try  to  show  how  these
distinctions can be accounted for by means of Maddalena’s classification of gestures as
complete and incomplete. This distinction depends on the different kinds of blending
between  the  three  semiotic  elements  –  icon,  index,  symbol  –  and  the  three
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phenomenological  categories  –  firstness,  secondness,  thirdness  –  that  a  gesture
embodies.  While  dismissing  and  preoccupied  attachment  patterns  seem  to  be
characterized by the performance of  different  kinds of  incomplete  gestures,  secure
individuals appear to be able to express themselves by means of gestures provided with
a higher degree of completeness. This discussion shows a clear connection between the
semiotic  and  phenomenological  category  of  completeness,  and  the  psychological
category of security. The normative import of this connection will be briefly discussed
in the conclusions (part 7).4
 
2. A Semiotic Reading of Psychology? Historical
Antecedents
15 In the recent decades, different authors have been attempting to read psychological
processes  by  selecting  between  a  semiotic  or  a  pragmatic  approach.  Both  of  these
approaches have been pursued in relation to psychoanalytic theory. From a semiotic
standpoint,  a  reference  to  Lacan  is  unavoidable.  In  his  original  development  of
Freudian psychoanalysis, Lacan apparently overturned one of the key assumptions of
his  master.  While  Freud  explicitly  stated  that  unconscious  representations  are  not
linguistic,  Lacan  maintained  that  the  unconscious  is  structured  like  a  language.
Although  this  statement  does  not  mean  that  the  unconscious  is  linguistic  (Cimatti
2015),  it  is  undeniable  that  Lacan  opened  the  door  to  a  semiotic  reading  of
psychoanalyis. Lacanian psychoanalysis was based on the French tradition of semiosis
started by Fernand de Saussure, and on the work of the Czech linguist Roman Jakobson.
16 On the pragmatic side, one could recall Alfred Lorenzer’s proposal. In some ways, the
work of Lorenzer is in accordance with Freud’s fundamental hypotheses. Specifically,
he  maintained  that  psychotherapy  has  to  deal  with  unconscious  behaviors  which
cannot be fully conceived as linguistic. But in contrast to Freud, he refused to conceive
the distinction between the linguistic and conscious dimension and the non linguistic
unconscious  dimension  in  dichotomic  terms.  As  an  alternative,  he  proposed  to
distinguish between symbols – that is, linguistic expressions – and stereotypes. 
17 While  symbols  can  also  be  employed  outside  a  specific  and  concrete  context,
stereotypes may act only inside a specific dramatic setting. Also, in contrast to symbols,
stereotypes  make  any  separation  between  subject  and  object  impossible.  This
impossibility has crucial consequences. The separation of the subject from the object
leaves room for the intervention of reflexive thought. By reflecting, the subject can
select  his  possible  responses  to  a  certain  object.  In  this  way,  symbols  can  be
transformed and adapted to the changes of the social and relational context.5 On the
contrary, stereotypes force the individual into a net of repetitions and automatisms.
This  behavior  is  fixed  and  rigid,  and  it  cannot  be  adapted  to  the  varying  social
environment. As long as they continue to produce unbearable conflicts, some contents
are  de-symbolized:  they  disappear  from  consciousness,  but  continue  acting  as
repetitive  uncontrollable  patterns  within  a  specific  scene,  that  is,  within  a  specific
interactional environment. 
18 Thus  there  is  a  wide  array  of  writing  which attempts  to  apply  either  semiotics  or
pragmatism  in  the  study  of  psychology  and  psychoanalysis.  Authors  who  elect  to
integrate both semiotic  and pragmatic  approaches in the same work have been far
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more sporadic. Some authors (Santaella 1986; Nordtug 2004; Santarelli 2013) have tried
to bring together Lacan and lines of reasoning based on pragmatist authors such as
Mead  and  Peirce.  Perhaps  the  most  systematic  attempt  at  reading  psychoanalysis
pragmatically through the lens of a pragmatic semiotics has been pursued by Vincent
Colapietro.  In  a  series  of  articles,  Colapietro  discusses  psychoanalytic  issues  by
employing Peircean theoretical tools. One of the most interesting outcomes of these
discussions is  the concept  of  the logical  quasi-final  interpretant.  Debating with the
philosopher Teresa de Lauretis (2000), Colapietro originally defines that logical quasi-
final interpretant as an interpretant which, despite producing a habit, obstructs any
critical reflection and reconstruction of the habit itself.  This kind of interpretant is
exemplified by neurotic habits, a typical case of habits provided with generality, but
resistant  against  any  habit  change  driven  by  self  reflection.  Similarly  to  the
stereotypical  unconscious  processes  defined  by  Lorenzer,  logical  quasi-final
interpretants are defined by Colapietro as:
Any  habit  that  would  arrest  or,  worse,  destroy  opportunities  for  cultivating
deliberately  formed,  self-analyzing habits,  but  which would do  so  in  its  role  as
quasi-final interpretant, would have a very important status within the economy of
our psychic lives. (Colapietro 2000: 146)
19 The approach followed in this paper is undoubtedly sympathetic to that proposed by
Colapietro. The idea according to which both conscious and unconscious processes can
be dealt with in a semiotic and pragmatic way is one of the key theses of the present
paper.  By  moving  from  this  Peircean  background,  I  will  discuss  the  possibility  of
reading the existing classification of attachment patterns in a semiotic way. In doing
this, I will make use of conceptual tools provided by a recent book, written by another
author inspired by Peirce.
 
3. Giovanni Maddalena’s Peircean Theory of Gestures
20 In his book The Philosophy of Gesture, Maddalena defines gesture as “any performed act
with a beginning and an end that carries a meaning (from gero = I bear, I carry on)”
(Maddalena 2015:  69-70).  In  accordance with Peirce’s  pragmatic  maxim,  meaning is
defined as “the cluster of conceivable effects of an experience” (70). 
21 Gestures can be classified as complete and incomplete.  Maddalena defines complete
gestures both in a semiotic and in a phenomenological way. From a semiotic point of
view,  a  complete  gesture  unites  all  three  semiotic  elements:  Icons  –  “signs  that
represent their objects by similarity” –; indexes – “signs that represent their object by
direct  contiguity or  brute force” –;  symbols  –  “signs that  represent their  object  by
interpretation” (Maddalena 2015: 20). 
22 From  a  phenomenological  point  of  view,  a  complete  gesture  consists  in  the  equal
blending of Peirce’s phenomenological categories: firstness, secondness and thirdness.6
Peirce defines firstness as the quality “of feeling, or of mere appearance […] the quality
itself, independently of its being perceived or remebered, is an example” (CP 8.328). It
is the “flavor sui  generis” (1.531) of experience, the qualitatively connotated novelty
which cannot be temporarily labelled into a pre-existing schema. Secondness is “the
element of struggle” (1.322), “the experience of effort” which “cannot exist without the
experience  of  resistance”  (8.330).  It  is  the  dimension  of  occurrence,  of  something
actually occuring and therefore involving “forceful relations of action and reaction”
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(Short 2007: 78). Finally, thirdness is the element of generality: “The third element of
the phenomenon […] that we perceive it to be intelligible, that is, to be subject to a law,
or capable of being represented by a general sign or Symbol” (8.268). On account of its
lawful nature, thirdness imparts “a quality to reactions in the future” (1.343). 
23 The balanced blending of the three semiotic and phenomenological categories involves
some specific features. A complete gesture must then be creative, insofar as it embodies
the  iconicity  of  possible  forms  and  feelings;  it  must  be  unrepeatable,  insofar  as  it
embodies the singularity of indexicality; it must be finally recognizable, insofar as it is
expression of a general regularity, which could be publicly acknowledged. In this way, a
complete gesture is  one which is  able  to synthesize,  and which makes possible  the
development from an original vagueness to the generality of consequences by means of
a concrete act. By means of a complete gesture we can act, communicate, understand
and learn at the same time. 
24 Conversely, incomplete gestures can be defined as those gestures in which at least one
of the three categories is weak – and even if they are never completely lacking. This
opens the path to a classification of incomplete gestures, according to the different
combination of the three categories or elements that these gesture could embody. A
gesture provided with thirdness,  but poor in firstness and secondness,  is  labeled as
abstraction or generalization. Gestures scarcely provided with firstness, but structured
by a blending of secondness and thirdness, are called by Maddalena schematizations, or
stereotypizations. This is the case of “a habit without novelty, a habit in Wittgenstein’s
sense of the word (like driving a car when one has long ago learned how)” (Maddalena
2015:  75).  In  both  cases,  firstness  and  iconicity  is  almost  lacking.  This  means  that
schematizations  and  abstractions  somehow  hinder  the  emergence  of  novelty,
understood  as  something  qualitatively  connotated  which  cannot  be  immediately
catalogued  in  the  existing  schema  and  concepts.  More  generally,  incompleteness
derives  from  a  blending  of  the  three  different  semiotic  semiotic  elements  or
phenomenological categories, in which at least one of the three is weakly present, even
if never completely missing. 
25 I can now introduce the key hypothesis of this paper: the various kinds of attachment
patterns  can  be  traced  back  to  the  different  kinds  of  gestures  which  are  usually
displayed  by  individuals.  These  gestures  can  be  successfully  classified  by  means  of
Maddalena’s  distinction  between  complete  and  incomplete  gesture,  and  by  the
consequent  taxonomy of  incomplete  gestures.  This  hypothesis  requires  of  course  a
small review of attachment theory, which will focus on the different ways in which
these different attachment patterns have been classified.
 
4. Defining and Measuring Attachment
26 The concepts of security and insecurity are two key concepts in attachment theory.
Attachment theory has been used by theorists to understand how the early experience
of  care  with  parental  figures  fosters  security.  The  field  of  attachment  theory  has
developed  starting  from  John  Bowlby’s  theory,  according  to  which  human  beings
develop  an  “attachment  behavioral  system  having  primary  and  immediate
responsibility  for  regulating  infant  safety  and  survival  in  the  environment  of
evolutionary adaptedness” (Main 1996: 237). Moving from Bowlby’s insights (Bowlby
1969/82), Mary Ainsworth catalogued four different ways of reacting to the so-called
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“Strange Situation” (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & Wall 1978). Strange Situation consists
of  a  laboratory  procedure,  in  which  the  child  is  observed  while  a  stranger  and  a
caregiver  enter  and leave  his  room.  These  movements  create different  situations  –
separation from the caregiver; being alone with a stranger; reunion with the caregiver,
and so on. According to the different reactions to these potentially stressful situations,
Ainsworth  labelled  the  attachment  behavior  of  the  observed  children  under  four
different  categories.  The  secure  child  explicitly  shows  that  she/he  is  missing  the
caregiver during the separation. Shortly after the reunion, the secure child returns to
actively interact with the parent. The avoidant child does not cry during separation,
she does not appear emotionally moved. When the parent comes back, the avoidant
child ignores him or her. The resistant/ambivalent child appears as preoccupied with
the parent during the whole procedure. He/she shows either angry or passive behavior,
and  he/she  is  not  able  to  play  with  the  caregiver  after  the  reunion.  Finally,  the
disorganized child may show disorganized behaviors – es. trance expressions – in the
presence of the parents. His/her behavior may also significantly overlap with the other
three categories. 
27 The Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) (George, Kaplan, & Main 1985/96) is one of the
most  significant  developments  in  attachment research.  While  the  Strange Situation
classifed attachment partners  in children,  AAI  codes attachment related systems of
representations in adults. The AAI is a 1 hour long interview, in which “participants are
asked for descriptions and evaluations of childhood attachment relationships, loss of
attachment  figures,  separations  from  attachment  figures,  and  the  effects  of  these
experiences on the participant’s development and personality” (Main 1996: 240).  By
analyzing the verbatim trascription, four different kinds of adult attachment systems
can detected. These four types of adult attachment explicitly reflect the four different
kinds of infant attachment identified by the Strange Situation. 
28 With respect  to  attachment,  a  secure-autonomous adult  will  be able  to  present life
experiences in a clear and coherent way. An adult will be classified as dismissing when
positive  evaluation  of  parents  are  not  supported,  or  contradicted,  by  concrete
examples,  or  when negative  experiences  are  downplayed.  Transcripts  of  dismissing
adults  are  normally  short.  The  preoccupied  type  displays  angryness  and  confusion
when talking about his/her life experiences. Responses are usually long, and sometimes
irrelevant to the topic of discussion. Finally, the unresolved-disorganized adult shows
striking lapses in the monitoring of reasoning or discourse when talking about abuses
or losses. 
29 Being based on the analysis of verbatim trascriptions, the AAI strongly emphasizes the
role of discourse and language in achieving the four different kinds of classifications.
Specifically, a great role is played by the violations of Paul Grice’s four conversational
maxisms:  quality,  quantity,  relation  and  manner.  For  instance,  as  showed  by  their
unusually  long  trascriptions,  preoccupied  adults  regularly  violate  the  maxim  of
quantity, insofar as they do not present and evaluate their life experiences in a succint
way,  as  required by  Grice’s  maxim.  But  the  central  role  of  language in  the  real  of
experiments such as these is  no longer valid in a theoretical  context.  According to
Main, differences in overt linguistic behavior reflect deeper differences in “states of
mind with respect to attachment” (Main 1993). Speech acts and comunication are the
superficial outcome of the deeper and determining level of internal representations.
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30 The full scope of attachment research is a vast subject, which cannot be adequately
treated here. However, there is a surprising fact that deserves attention. During the last
decades, attachment scholars have increasingly stressed the importance of the level of
mental  representation.  But  at  the  same  time,  processes  of  measurement  and
classification  of  attachment  have  increasingly  focused  on  language  and  semiotic
processes.  An increasingly  mentalistic  conception of  attachment processes  has  thus
been developing simultaneously with an increasing focus on linguistic  and semiotic
behaviors  as  signs  of  attachment.  This  increasing  focus  on  the  communicative
dimension  seems  to  encourage  our  attempt  to  analyze  attachment  theory  from  a
Peircean standpoint.  If  linguistic  –  and therefore semiotic  –  behavior  is  the crucial
domain of psychological observation, it follows that a semiotic approach in this regard
will be at least legitimate. The two following examples seem to confirm these optimistic
predictions. 
 
5. The Adult Attachment Projective: Complete and
Incomplete Narrations
31 The Adult Attachment Projective (AAP, George & West 2006) is an adult attachment
classification system based on the analysis of individuals’ responses to a set of seven
attachment-related drawings. These drawings are selected from pictures drawn from
children’s  literature,  psychology  textbooks,  and  photography  anthologies.  The  AAP
drawings depict events that,  according to theory, activate attachment;  for example,
illness, solitude, separation, and abuse (George & West 2001: 32). The participants in the
test  are  asked  to  tell  a  story  elicited  by  the  drawing.  Working  on  the  verbatim
trascriptions of the narrated story, the adults are classified according to the four AAI
categories: secure, dismissing, preoccupied and unresolved. 
32 These classifications and the way they are achieved could be accounted by means of a
gestural  approach.  The  participant  in  the  AAP  test  are  asked  to  produce  semiotic
gestures  –  i.e.  narrations  –  in  order  to  semiotically  develop  other  gestures  –  the
drawings. But even more surprisingly, these different classifications can be accounted
as different degrees and varieties of  incompleteness and completeness.7 In order to
prove this point, I will now present and briefly discuss three excerpts taken form the
examples  of  narrations classified as  dismissing,  preoccupied and secure attachment
provided by George and West. These narrations have been elicited by the projective
picture named “bed” (fig. 1).
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Figure 1. AAP projective picture: Bed
Dismissing Attachment. Um, for some reason I think these two people are black
because they have frizzy hair.  This is  a mom and her son on a bed.  The son is
reaching for the mom and the mom is not really reaching back for some reason.
And I’m not sure if it’s a cultural or just if it’s personal but she’s wearing slippers.
[…] Well the child is uh needy, is looking needy and the mom is sort of half there,
half not there. She’s probably giving as much as she can give these days just doesn’t
know what to do. Um, but she seems relaxed, the way her hands are folded and her
knees are crossed. (George & West 2001: 37)
33 On the level of the relation between the narrator and the narrated story, there are no
interferences. As George and West explain, “dismissing individuals rarely wander off
track (relation violation); they do not blur self – other boundaries during the story-
telling process and, thus, personal experience references are absent” (George & West
2001: 51). Therefore, secondness can be easily detected. On the contrary, firstness is
scarcely  present.  There is  no hint  of  feeling.  There is  a  clear  need of  labelling the
drawing  into  general  categories  –  es.  Black  people,  the  cultural  reason  of  wearing
slippers – but no hint of emotionality and feeling. “Descriptions of sensitive, reciprocal
interaction are typically absent in their story content. Instead, dyadic interaction may
appear to follow a social script or cultural rule that dictates how people should behave
in a particular context” (George & West 2001: 49). Even when the dismissing individual
indicates the self states of the characters of the narration and of the drawings – e.g. the
child is “needy” and the mother is “relaxed” – she or he usually portrays the characters
as involved in instrumental actions that do not involve or modify anyone’s subjective
experience (Talia 2016). 
Preoccupied Attachment. Well this one it seems like it’s sad. Um the child is sick
or hurt  or something and he’s  reaching out and I  can’t  tell  if  the mother’s  got
something in her hands wanting to – or you know she’s giving it to him – about to
give it to him or whether she’s just reaching her hands out, but she looks reserved,
kind-of held back – like she’s not leaning forward to him. […] Also reminds me of
when my husband was sick too. Yeah. Um I’d definitely see that this is being my
husband and you know this being me because that was really frustrating with him
being unable  to  communicate  –  I  didn’t  feel  there  was  anything I  could  do  –  I
couldn’t understand what he wanted, there was no way to find out what he wanted.
(George & West 2001: 38)
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34 Firstness is present since the first line – the child “seems like it is sad.” At the level of
the relation between the narrator and the narrated history, something happens at the
half of the narration. Particularly, the boundaries between the narrator’s story and the
narrated story blur. The narrator starts talking about the problems between her and
her  husband.  Lacking  these  boundaries,  the  story  looses  its  character  of  actual
occurrence, that is, its secondness. 
The invasion, so to speak, of self-references as part of the narrative suggests that
the individual is being overwhelmed by his or her attachment stress; that is, they
indicate  that  representational  merging  or  self-absorption  is  overwhelming
attention to the AAP picture as an external stimulus. (40)
35 In more recent projective experiments, this lack of boundaries plays a less decisive role
in the preoccupied narrations. However, scarceness of secondness easily reappears at
the level of the relations between the characters of the narration. In semi-projective
measures,  preoccupied  subjects  often  tell  stories  in  which  one  of  the  characters
obstructs the other’s response (e.g., a pictured child runs after the parents and then
shoots them, Kaplan 1987), or of the interviewer (e.g. the speaker loses track of the task
and begins discussing unrelated topics, George & West 2006). The preoccupied story-
telling then involves strategies in which one of the characters explicitly displays his
feelings  (firstness),  and  at  the  same  time  is  actively  engaged  in  discouraging  and
undermining the actual occurrences of the responses and contributions of the other
(weak secondness).
Secure Attachment. […] well this looks like bedtime and mum has just sat down to
– say goodnight and – this young fellow feels he needs a hug before he goes to sleep
– so she slides up a little closer to him an gives him a big hug – and ahh strokes his
head, his back and then tells him to roll over onto his tummy and she’ll give him a
bit of a massage – and that calms him down an’ – gets him ready for sleep and she
kisses him good-night – and leaves the room. (George & West 2001: 34)
36 The dimension of feeling is explicitly mentioned – “this young fellow feels he needs a
hug before he goes to sleep.” Secondness is present as well, since this story is explicitly
separated from the life of the narrator. The narrator seems to be involved somehow,
but still the boundaries between his story and the narrated story are explicit. The story
is  also  clearly  costructed  and  organized.  In  a  word,  there  is  connectedness  and
continuity,  and  therefore,  thirdness.  By  means  of  such  a  gesture,  the  narrator
recognizes the fact that the drawing depicts an attachment-relevant situation: “The
hallmark  of  security  in  the  AAP  is  the  demonstration  of  the  ability  to  draw  upon
attachment to remedy distress consequent to the activation of the attachment system
by  the  picture  scenes”  (48).  And  thus  we  have  a  complete  gestures  as  defined  by
Maddalena.  The story recognizes attachment by drawing a gesture – in this case,  a
narrative – which displays attachment.
37 The distinction between secure and insecure (dismissing and preoccupied) attachment,
as detected in the different “completing” stories, apparently consists in the presence of
gestures embodying different kinds and degrees of completeness and incompleteness.
Dismissing  stories  are  evidently  poor  in firstness.  By  following  Maddalena’s
classification, they could be labelled under the category of schematization. The very
name of this category expresses in a meaningful way the dismissing subject’s attempt
to downplay the “quality” of the narration and the singular quality of the experiences
of the characters, by directing them into general and social categories and schema –
the mum and the child “should be black,” and she wears slippers for cultural reasons.
Security as Completeness
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-1 | 2017
11
38 Preoccupied-subject narrations are on the contrary provided with firstness, but poor in
secondness. The incapacity of setting boundaries between the narrated story and the
narrator’s own story is well accounted for by the category of “projection” (firstness and
thirdness, scarce secondness), that is, an “action that plans or models or fosters further
relationships without the actual happening of their occurrence” (Maddalena 2015: 77).
The same process can be seen operating in the interactions between the characters of
the story. Relationships in this case are shaped by one character’s actions obstructing
the other character’s actions. This obstruction can take two forms: in some cases it
prevents the very physical occurence of this action, at other times its it simply blocks
the action from having meaningful consequences.
39 Finally,  narrations  by  secure  individuals  evidently  overcome the  incompleteness  of
projective-preoccupied narrations and of schematizing-dismissing ones. They are poor
neither in secondness, nor in firstness. They are well constructed, well connected and
coherent narrations,  in which the firstness of  feeling emerges without blurring the
specificity of the narrated story, and its separation from the personal experience of the
narrator. The characters of the narration express their feelings, and they are open to
the contributions of the other characters. 
40 To sum up, differences in attachment as they emerge from the narratives of the AAP
can be easily and completely described in terms of complete and incomplete gestures.
These  differences,  therefore,  appear  as  semiotic  and  communicative  differences.
According to both Main and George, these linguistic signs refer to a cognitive internal
object, that is, the system of internal representations. People communicate in different
ways  because  their  systems  of  internal  representation  are  different.  Recently,  this
presumed  need  for  an  internal  representational  difference  as  the  explanation  for
differences in communication and in attachment has been challenged.
 
6. A Radical Move to Communication. The Patient
Attachment Coding System
41 The  connection  between  completeness  and  security;  the  isomorphism  between
different  kinds  of  insecure  attachment  patterns  and  different  kinds  of  incomplete
gestures: these analogies are even more stunning once we acknowledge that they can
also be singled out in a more recent theoretical attempt. In his 2015 paper, Alessandro
Talia et al. tried to radicalize the linguistic turn implicitly inaugurated by Main and
George. Both AAI and AAP are empirically focused on linguistic speech acts. At the same
time, they consider these communicative behaviors as signs of an underlying internal
set of representations, which structure both the linguistic behavior and the attachment
pattern  of  the  individual.  On  the  contrary,  Alessandro  Talia’s  Patient  Attachment
Coding System (PACS, Talia,  Miller-Bottome & Daniel 2015) endorses a more radical
semiotic and communicative approach, by focusing on the qualities and the characters
of  speech  and  language  without  requiring  the  mediating  function  of  internal
representations. Talia et al. do not believe that internal representations shape our ways
of communicating a priori. Rather, they endorse the pragmatist viewpoint according to
which  people  understand  their  experiences,  either  internal  or  external,  by
communicating them.
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42 PACS  is  a  transcript-based  instrument  that  assesses  clients’  in-session  attachment
based  on  any  session  of  psychotherapy.  Specifically,  sessions  of  psychotherapy  are
recorded and transcribed, and the linguistic expressions and behaviors of the patient
are  analyzed  by  means  of  markers.  These  markers  are  catalogued  and  analyzed
according  to  four  scales:  Proximity-Seeking  Contact-maintaining  scales,  which
comprise markers that actively elicit or encourage attunement; the Avoidance scale,
which  comprises  markers  that  shift  the  attention  away  from  clients’  ongoing
experience and avoid the direct elicitation of attunement;  and the Resistance scale,
which comprises markers that prevent the therapist from expressing a different point
of view, thereby impeding any less than perfect attunement (Talia et al. 2015: 8). The
ratings attained in these scales are employed as means to classify the different kinds of
attachment patterns. 
43 Dismissing individuals normally obtain high levels on avoidance scale, associated with
an evasion of the therapist’s inquiries into patients’s positive and negative experience,
and  a  minimization  of  the  patient’s  mental  states  regarding  this  subject.  What  is
interesting, is that these strategies seem to apply not only to stressing situations, but to
positive experiences as well. In Peircean terms: these strategies involve avoidance of
firstness in general,  whatever the connotation of this firstness is.  This avoidance is
clearly represented by the strategies of generalization, often employed by dismissing
patients. Let us take an example form everyday life. Someone asks me: “How do you
feel after breaking up with your girlfriend?,” and I answer “I feel like anyone in my
own situation would.” My generalizing gesture is an instance of “schematization,” that
is a gesture poor in firstness but not in secondness and thirdness. This gesture allows
the avoidance of the direct expression of feeling, by including the actual occurrence of
the event in a general pattern, without expressing what Peirce would call the “flavor”
of my experience (CP 1.531). 
44 Preoccupied score  high with the  resistance scale.  This  scale  tracks  the  attempts  in
enlisting the therapist’s agreement with the patient’s views, and the disregard and the
limitation  of  the  therapist’s  contributions.  Preoccupied  patients  are  then  actively
involved in limiting and even in denying the “secondness” of the contribution of the
therapist: 
Whenever they [dismissing individuals] express their experience, they tend to do so
in a way that restricts independent contribution from the therapist – for example,
they  quote  themselves  verbatim  instead  of  describing  their  experience  from  a
present  perspective.  Finally,  whenever  the  therapist  attempts  to  reflect  the
experience  of  the  patient,  the  patient  reacts  as  if  she  did  not  hear  what  the
therapist said. (Talia 2016: 23) 
45 On the contrary, the secure patient directly express her thoughts, is able to reflect on
them and to negotiate them with the others, by taking into account their contributions
to the conversation. Security is then matched once again with increasingly complete
gestures, showing more balanced blend of the three semiotic elements and the three
phenomenological  categories.  A  completeness  that,  by  the  way,  seems to  express  a
reflexive  habit  of  thought  similar  to  what  Colapietro  pointed  at  in  distinguishing
between  quasi  final  and  final  logical  interpretants.  We  will  briefly  discuss  the
connection between completeness, security and rexflexivity in the conclusions.
46 The validity and the aptness of a semiotic reading of the classification of the different
patterns  of  attachment  seems  to  be  reconfirmed.  Dismissing  individuals  in  the
therapeutical  context  often  produce  incomplete  gestures  in  the  form  of
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schematizations and generalizations. Preoccupied individuals gesturally express their
inner  feelings,  but  tend  to  strongly  resist  the  contributions  of  the  therapist.  This
resistance can be either direct – e.g. reacting as if they did not hear what the therapist
said – or indirect – e.g. enlisting interpretations of their expressions provided by other
people,  in  order  to  imply that  the interpretations of  the therapist  are  superfluous.
Finally, security is once again marked by the ability of producing gestures provided
with a higher level of blending between the three phenomenological categories and the
three semiotic elements, and therefore, a higher level of completeness. 
 
7. Conclusion: Security, Completeness and
Normativity
47 To  sum  up,  the  distinction  between  complete  and  incomplete  gestures  and  the
classification of different kinds of incomplete gesture seem to be a promising way to
account for  differences in attachment.  Such an account will  be communicative and
semiotic. This means that it deals with the way in which people communicate, rather
than necessarily calling into account a hidden system of internal representations. Such
a  Peircean  account  appears  consistent  with  recent  developments  in  attachment
research.
48 As we already noted, both Main’s and George’s systems of classification explicitly focus
on language and speech acts. At the same time, they consider language as a sort of
external  sign of  an internal  system of  representation,  and they consider this  latter
system as the real effective causal ground in determining differences in attachment.
Starting from a move to the level of the relation, Talia and his colleagues have been
moving  towards  a  radicalization  of  the  primacy  of  communication.  Rather  than
considering the “external” level of language as the indirect expression of the internal
structuring system of representations, they have increasingly focused on the way in
which  internal  states  are  expressed  and  communicated.  In  this  way,  it  is
communicative  habits  which  shape  the  internal  states,  rather  than  the  other  way
around. Since, as pragmatists maintain, we understand through communication, there
is  no  hidden  inner  process  occurring  before,  or  hidden  behind  communication,
structuring  our  communications  themselves.  An  avoidant  communication  of  our
internal  states is  made up of  incomplete gestures poor in firstness and iconicity.  A
person who expresses and communicates her internal states in a dismissing way, will
also  tend  to  have  an  avoidant  exprerience  and  understanding  of  her  own internal
states. This move to the level of communication appears particularly consistent with
the Peircean account proposed in this paper. This focus on communicative and semiotic
processes is the background of the continuity between logic and psychology. At the
same time, this continuity does not eliminate or ignore mental states. Psychology deals,
among other things, with internal states, focusing on the way in which these mental
states are expressed, communicated and negotiated with the other persons.8 
49 Lastly,  I  would  like  to  briefly  return  to  the  opening  issue  concerning  the  relation
between  logic and  psychology.  I  previously  claimed  that  the  present  account  of
psychology could be framed into Peirce’s original and functional anti-psychologism.
Once we endorse Peirce’s broad idea of logic as the study of the connections between
signs, it follows that psychological processes – both conscious and unconscious – could
be  accounted  for  in  a  communicative,  and  therefore  logically  relevant  way.  They
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respectively  embody  different  degrees  and  qualities  of  completeness  or,  to  use
Colapietro’s terms, of finality. This could be a good example of Peirce’s statement: “For
in my opinion, excepting Metaphysics, there is no science that is more in need of the
science of Logic than Psychology proper is” (EP2: 501). But following Calcaterra and
Colapietro, it has been noticed that logic cannot be reduced to some kind of analysis of
observed psychobiological habits. Rather, being a normative science, logic preserves its
normativity. It  should tell  us “how to think,” instead of simply describing “how we
think.” 
50 In  this  paper,  psychological  differences  in  attachment  have  been  connected  to
Maddalena’s taxonomy of complete and incomplete gestures. Since these distinctions
are  both  phenomenological  and  semiotic,  they  must  have  by  hypotheses  a  certain
logical import. In turn, logic involves normativity. This begs the following question:
What is the normative import of this reading of attachment theory?
51 A  partial  answer  to  this  difficult  question  could  be  sought  by  focusing  on  the
connection  between  security  and  completeness.  It  has  come  to  light  how  secure
attachment is expressed by gestures embodying a higher degree of completeness, in
comparison  to  the  incomplete  gestures  characterizing  dismissing  and  preoccupied
attachment. Secure individuals usually communicate their internal states and their life
experiences in a more direct, coeherent and open way. They are eager to express the
firstness of their experience, without downplaying the communication of their feeling;
they do not usually strategically discourage the contributions of the therapist in PACS –
they do not downplay secondness; their accounts are more coherently articulated and
more consistent. They thus display a higher degree of continuity, in the Peircean sense
of the term, and therefore a higher degree of thirdness.  A connection between this
higher degree of completeness and security thus emerges.
52 Now,  it  is  equally  clear  how  the  concept  of  security  in  attachment  psychology  is
provided with a clear normative import. Given their qualities, secure communications
are a desirable condition for the development and the success of therapy. They open
the path to a more constructive and productive communicative interaction between
client and therapist. Some authors have placed so much importance on this aspect that
they suggest that the development of secure attachment in infants should be a positive
goal which society should be try to achieve.9 Without taking part in this discussion, it is
hard  to  deny  that  secure  attachment  is  a  desirable  end  in  the  context  of  therapy
(Holmes 2015). Although security does not imply absence of psychological problems in
any  way,  such  a  condition  is  helpful  for  the  sake  of  a  productive  communicative
relation between client and therapist and for the development of therapy. Increasingly
complete gestures are then normatively connoted in the therapeutic context. Contrary
to what the commonsensical understanding of the term “completeness” may involve,
complete gestures open new ways for communication, rather than closing them. And
conversely,  incomplete  gestures  characterizing  insecure  attachment  lead  to  more
difficult communication between patient and therapist. 
Clients with a secure classification are able to elicit attunement and are open to the
therapist’s attempts to attune. As a consequence, they share their experience in an
open and balanced way,  which facilitates  focused therapist  interventions.  These
clients also demonstrate a willingness to take into account alternative perspectives
and consider their own perspective as fallible, which may facilitate the emergence
of mentalization (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target 2002). […] Conversely, many of
the markers of insecure in-session attachment seem to constitute obstacles to good
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therapeutic process.  Namely,  our observations suggest that avoidant patterns of
attunement  prevent  an  experientially  grounded  therapeutic  dialogue,  while
preoccupied patterns seem to make it difficult for clients and therapists to maintain
a consistent focus on the therapeutic tasks. (Talia et al. 2015)
53 The connection between security and completeness is therefore explictly connotated in
a normative way, at least in the context of therapy. Secure individuals’ capacity for
balanced expression of their own experiences and recognition of their own “fallibilism”
constitutes a desirable condition. Therefore, security is not only an observation-based
description of how some people actually communicate, but also a suggestion about how
people “should” communicate for the sake of therapy. 
54 I would like to conclude with a final consideration. Fonagy et al. (1991) showed how
secure  classifications  in  the  AAI  are  related  to  the  reflective  function,  that  is  the
capacity to accurately indicate mental states underlying behavior in the self and the
other.  This  means  that,  beside  being  connected  with  coherence,  openness  and
fallibilism, security is also connected with the capacity of reflecting on mental states,
and of considering mental states in the self and the other as the object of a further
examination and scrutiny. The normative connection between security, completeness
and  reflexive  capacity  seems  to  be  perfectly  consistent  with  Colapietro’s  brilliant
explanation of Peirce’s view of logic both as a normative science and as a “particular
species of morality”:
We can mind what we say and infer. The critic of argument ultimately makes sense
only in reference to our capacity to exert a critical, decisive measure of control over
what we say and how we reason. Logic as the critic of argument, thus, implies a
critic in the sense of a deliberative agent self-consciously assuming a critical stance
towards the use of signs as instruments of inquiry. (Colapietro 2003: 158)
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NOTES
1. On the impossibility of conceiving Mead as a behaviorist, see Joas 1985.
2. It is probable that such a reconstruction of the relationships between psychology and logic
does not literally reflect Peirce’s position in this respect. Such a gap could be explained also by
referring to historical circumstances. Suffice to say that when Peirce was writing the kind of
psychology which I will discuss in the paper – mainly, psychoanalysis and attachment theory –
neither  of  these  fields  had  yet  come  into  existance.  At  the  same  time,  an  anti-dichotomic
distinction between logic and psychology is far from contradictory to Peirce’s views. 
3. Some authors have suggested that Peirce’s externalism goes as far as to deny the existence of
the self  (see De Waal 2013).  An opposite viewpoint has been proposed by Vincent Colapietro,
whose 1989 book aims at reconstructing “Peirce’s approach to the self.” Its complexity – and at
times its ambiguities – renders this debate a still living and fruitiful one. 
4. The  reader  could  be  legitimately  puzzled  by  the  decisive  role  played  by  psychological
literature  in  a  philosophical  paper  discussing  Peirce’s  anti-psychologism.  I  will  address  this
confusion in the following way. These references cannot be avoided given the purpose of the
paper:  moving from Peirce’s  original  and complex anti-psychologism in order to articulate a
semiotic  analysis  of  psychological  categories.  Even though such an analysis  could have been
pursued at a pure philosophical level, the decision to discuss psychological literature stems from
the acknowledgment of scientific psychology as a legitimate and necessary source of knowledge
with regards to psychological processes. Such an approach is in step with the anti-reductionist
naturalistic  approach  characterizing  pragmatism.  I  would  like  to  thank  one  of  the  two
anonymous reviewers for pointing out the need for making such a clarification. 
5. In this regard, Lorenzer is extremely close to George Herbert Mead. See Mead 1934.
6. This reconstruction of Peirce’s phenomenological categories follows T. L. Short’s impressive
reconstructive work in Short (2007, especially 75-84).
7. We leave aside the tricky epistemological case of the “unresolved.” 
8. For an alternative reading of attachment patterns as interpetants, see Crittenden & Landini
2015. 
9. This overly wide normative connotation of security has been criticized by Meins 2017.
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ABSTRACTS
Peirce’s anti-psychologism hinges on two main assumptions. First, logic and psychology belong
to two separate disciplines – respectively, the normative sciences and the experimental sciences.
Second, externalism must be understood as a crucial and inescapable epistemological criterion.
The introspectionist illusion, according to which individuals have direct and epistemologically
flawless  access  to  their  own  internal  states,  should  be  dismissed.  As  Colapietro  (2003)  and
Calcaterra (2006) observe, Peirce’s standpoint is far different from the Kantian classical account
of  anti-psychologism.  This  original  take  on  anti-psychologism  leaves  room  for  a  functional
distinction  between  logic  and  psychology,  emerging  from  a  semiotic  and  communicative
continuity.  This  means  that  psychology,  unlike  logic  as  a  formal  doctrine  of  signs,  will  be
epistemologically appropriate for dealing with internal psychological states, on the condition
that this inquiry be focused on the communicative processes through which these internal states
are expressed and conveyed.
Such  a  Peircean  account  of  anti-psychologism forms  the  epistemological  background of  this
paper. My goal is to show how Peirce’s approach to communication and semiosis can be applied
in order to discuss a specific psychological theory, in this case, attachment theory. Specifically, I
propose employing Giovanni Maddalena’s Peircean distinction between complete and incomplete
gestures  (Maddalena  2015)  to  account  for  the  distinction  between  secure,  dismissing  and
preoccupied attachment patterns. To this end, I will be discussing three different measurements
of attachment: the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI, George, Kaplan & Main 1985), the Adult
Attachment Projection (AAP, George & West 2006), and the Patient Attachment Coding System
(PACS,  Talia,  Miller-Bottome  &  Daniel  2015).  Throughout  this  discussion,  I  will  examine  the
connection  between the  semiotic  and  phenomenological  category  of  completeness,  and  the
psychological category of security. This connection involves an interesting normative import,
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